

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T GENEVA 04352

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: POST PLENARY HEADS OF DELEGA-  
TION MEETING,3/21;UK ASSOCIATION WITH SEPARATE  
VERIFICATION AGREEMENT

CTB MESSAGE NO. 186

1. DURING POST PLENARY HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON  
MARCH 21, EDMONDS (UK) PROVIDED BRIEF SUMMARY OF UK  
THINKING ON ASSOCIATION OF UK WITH THE SEPARATE VERIFICA-  
TION AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT DECISION ON UK POLICY,  
WHICH WAS NOW PENDING ACTION BY UK MINISTERS, WOULD  
INVOLVE UK DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE  
UNITED STATES, "BUT NOT AS AN EQUAL POINT IN A TRILATERAL  
TRIANGLE". THE BRITISH WOULD NOT EXPECT TO HAVE THEIR  
OWN INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS), NOR WOULD THEY  
ASK TO MAKE WHOLLY INDEPENDENT REQUESTS FOR ON-SITE  
INSPECTIONS (OSIS) OR WANT A WHOLLY INDEPENDENT UK  
INSPECTION TEAM. THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE PART IN THE  
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CONSULTATIVE PROCESS; THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO  
INCLUDE A BRITISH ELEMENT IN A PREDOMINANTLY US INSPECTION  
TEAM; AND THEY WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PLANNING  
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ISIS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

2. MOROKHOV THEN COMMENTED TO EDMONDS "THIS WOULD BE A  
PROFITABLE ASSOCIATION--FOR YOU". HE ASKED WHETHER UK

WOULD HAVE ISIS FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. FAKLEY (UK) ANSWERED THAT THIS WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED. HOWEVER, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE, THE UK WOULD INTEND TO CONTRIBUTE SOME OF THE STATIONS WHICH WERE SPONSORED BY THE UK IN COMMONWEALTH TERRITORIES.

3. MOROKHOV SAID IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THE BRITISH WOULD CARRY OUT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, BUT IT COULD TEST IN DISTANT TERRITORIES UNDER ITS JURISDICTION. HE EXPECTED THE UK TO COME UP WITH PROPOSALS FOR WHERE IT WOULD INSTALL ISIS IN ITS TERRITORY. FAKLEY SAID THIS MIGHT NOT BE A PROBLEM BECAUSE MAYBE, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY COULD CONSIDER A STATION IN HONG KONG AND ONE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ITSELF.

4. MOROKHOV EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE EQUALITY IN FRAMING THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MEET THE SAME REQUIREMENTS. IF YOU WANT TO HAVE THE BENEFITS OF THE AGREEMENT, YOU HAVE TO PAY SOMETHING. EDMONDS CONCLUDED THAT THE BRITISH WANTED THEIR ASSOCIATION TO BE A POSITIVE FACTOR. HE ASKED MOROKHOV TO KEEP IN MIND THAT IF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT INVOLVED JUST THE US AND USSR, THIS COULD LOOK LIKE A SUPERPOWER SET-UP. IN THIS SENSE, UK ASSOCIATION MIGHT HAVE POSITIVE POLITICAL IMPACT. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT NO MATTER HOW THE MATTER WAS HANDLED, THERE WOULD  
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ALWAYS BE CHARGES OF SUPERPOWER CONSPIRACY.

5. COMMENT: THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT MOROKHOV'S COMMENTS MAY NOT BE DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE GREATER UK PARTICIPATION IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT BUT RATHER TO DISCOURAGE ANY ASSOCIATION AT ALL. SOVS MIGHT HAVE IN MIND THAT INSISTENCE ON FULL EQUALITY; I.E., REQUIRING UK TO HAVE SAME NUMBER OF ISIS AS THEY DO, WOULD CREATE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BURDEN, WITH NO GENUINELY PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION, THAT THIS WOULD DISCOURAGE BRITISH ASSOCIATION.

ARTIFICIALITY OF MOROKHOV'S LINE OF ARGUMENT IS REVEALED BY ASKING WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD REALLY HAVE INTEREST IN UNDERTAKING THE EXPENSE OF ASSIGNING TRAINED PERSONNEL FOR PARTICIPATING IN INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF UK ISIS. IT CAN PROBABLY BE FAIRLY SAFELY ASSUMED THAT SOVIETS WOULD PREFER NOT TO HAVE UK FULLY PARTICIPATING ALONG WITH US IN PRIVATE AND DELICATE DISCUSSIONS WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. QUESTION FOR US TO DECIDE, AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH UK DURING RECESS IN WASHINGTON, WILL OBVIOUSLY BE HOW FAR WE CAN AND SHOULD GO TO BAT FOR THE UK TO SECURE

THEIR ASSOCIATION WHEN SOVS MAY NOT WANT ANY UK ASSOCIA-  
TION AND WHEN SOME ASPECTS OF UK ASSOCIATION, SUCH AS FULL  
UK PARTICIPATION IN JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, MAY  
ALSO NOT BE WHOLLY CONVENIENT FOR US. END COMMENT.WARNKE

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## Message Attributes

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